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CORPORATE MIGRATIONS AND TAX TRANSPARENCY AND
DISCLOSURE
DIANE M. RING*
INTRODUCTION
Migration generally refers to the movement of peoples across borders. But
the broader look at migration in this conference incorporates the movement of
business across borders. This expanded concept enables us to better understand
the complex jurisdictional relationships between and among nations and their
members. The latter part of the twentieth century, in particular the period from
the 1980s onward, saw notable growth in business expansion across borders.'
Such expansion, though certainly not without precedent, was spurred by a
number of factors including reduced currency and investment restrictions, and
increased ability to manage global activities through technology and
communications.
Twenty plus years into this business globalization, we have also witnessed
the rise of transparency and disclosure rules and regimes that have dominated
much of global international tax reform. 2 Debates over tax transparency and
disclosure have permeated public discussions and the advocacy platforms of
nongovernmental organizations. With regard to corporate taxpayers, the primary
concern has been the ability of multinationals to pursue various tax structures
and planning strategies that, though perhaps not constituting evasion,
nonetheless constitute a form of tax avoidance that is not, or should not be,
permitted. Accompanying the various substantive law reforms targeting such tax
* Professor of Law and the Dr. Thomas F. Carney Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law
School. I would like to thank participants in the Sanford E. Sarasohn Conference on Critical Issues
in Comparative and International Taxation II at St. Louis University School of Law, including
Allison Christians, David Elkins, Heather Field, Leandra Lederman, Shu-Yi Oei, Henry Ordower,
Kerry Ryan, and Cristina Trenta for their helpful comments. I would like to thank the Dr. Thomas
F. Carney '47 Gift Fund for its valuable support.
1. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 9, 11, 20.
2. See, e.g., Diane Ring, Article 26: Exchange of Information, in IBFD, GLOBAL TAX
TREATY COMMENTARIES §§ 1.2.3, 1.2.5.9, 1.2.5.9.1 (2017) [hereinafter Ring, Article 26]; Diane
Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN
PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 497, 497 (Alexander Trepelkov, et al.
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Ring, Transparency and Disclosure].
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avoidance have been a series of transparency and disclosure mechanisms aimed
at supporting the effort to curtail tax base erosion.
Among the most prominent examples of such transparency and disclosure
mechanisms, either enacted or being considered, are: (1) country-by-country
reporting of tax information (from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD") Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS")
Project), (2) automatic exchange of tax rulings among jurisdictions, and (3)
disclosure of beneficial ownership of entities. 3 Additional high-profile
measures, predominantly aimed at the conduct of individual tax evaders, include
the Common Reporting Standard ("CRS") for automatic exchange of certain
financial account information and Intergovernmental Agreements ("IGAs")
calling for automatic sharing of certain information by foreign financial
institutions with the United States.4 These measures come at some cost to
taxpayers and third parties, which must gather, collate, review, and report the
data.s Additionally, taxpayers express concern over the possibility that the newly
reported data will be made public illegally, or perhaps legally in the future, and
thus harm their business competitiveness. 6
In this Essay, I suggest that the contemporary focus on transparency and
disclosure is substantially due to the ease of corporate migration and movement
across borders. Increased transparency and disclosure are the price for the
increased business border flexibility. International transactions have always
been part of the economic picture.' But to the extent taxpayers and transactions
were historically domestically focused, tax authorities had more access to
information and more ability to control all of the relevant tax law.
3. Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, §§ 1.2.5.7, 1.2.5.10, 1.2.5.14; Ring, Transparency and
Disclosure, supra note 2, at 497-98.
4. Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, §§ 1.2.5.5, 4.4.2.1; Ring, Transparency and Disclosure,
supra note 2, at 497-98; see also Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 EMORY
L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-
Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 16, 68) (on file with authors).
5. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 353-62 (2015);
NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 331-43 (2014); NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 238-48 (2013); Oei, supra note 4,
at 56, 70; Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 67.
6. See, e.g., JASON J. FICHTNER & ADAM N. MICHEL, MERCATUS CTR., COMMENT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
4 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Fichtner-Country-by-Country-PIC-vl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3B5T-E9EJ] ("Assembling a new, centralized database of highly sensitive
corporate financial information increases the vulnerability of proprietary business data. It would
take just one breach of the system, in any one of the party jurisdictions, for all the information to
be exposed."); Margaret Burow, CbC Could Be a 'Nightmare'for Corporate Tax Departments, 77
TAX NOTES INT'L 674, 674-75 (2015).
7. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of US.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J., 1021, 1022-24 (1997); Philip R. West & Amanda P. Varma,
The Past and Future of the Foreign Tax Credit, TAXES, Mar. 2012, at 27, 27.
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With the advent of globalization, the information necessary to understand
and evaluate taxpayers has become harder to secure because more data is outside
the United States and because tax planning now implicates both domestic and
foreign tax law. This observation does not justify any specific form of disclosure
and reporting requirement. It does explain why such reporting has become
increasingly important in recent years. Moreover, it suggests that the BEPS
momentum and its focus on certain categories of tax planning are not the core
drivers for transparency and disclosure developments. Rather, modem business
migration is the fundamental force underpinning the creation of new reporting
and disclosure regimes. The regimes' precise shape and timing are then a
function of convulsive triggers such as tax leaks and/or financial crises that
trigger specific moments of reform.
I. THE RISE OF BORDER MOBILITY
The globalization literature generally, as well as analyses of trends in
finance, currency, and investment specifically, note the impact of "de-
regulation" that began in the late 1970s but gathered momentum in the 1980s
and continues through to the present.8 This deregulation facilitated the
movement of capital and investment across borders. A rise in technology,
including information technology and communication, further eased border
mobility. It is important to reiterate that there is no claim that cross-border
commerce was heretofore unknown. Active and extensive commerce reaching
across Africa, Asia, and Europe occurred certainly by the post-classical period.9
Yet the changes taking shape in the 1980s contributed to a new level of cross-
border investment and business activity, both in kind and volume. The following
Sections provide a very brief overview of these developments.
8. See generally Nicholas A. Ashford, Ralph P. Hall & Kyriakos Pierrakakis, Globalization:
Technology, Trade Regimes, Capital Flows, and International Economy, in NICHOLAS A.
ASHFORD & RALPH P. HALL, TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALIZATION, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: TRANSFORMING THE INDUSTRIAL STATE 183, 185 (2011); Richard O'Brien &
Alasdair Keith, The Geography ofFinance: After the Storm, 2009 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON.
& Soc'Y 245, 247-48; Lucio Sarno & Mark P. Taylor, Exchange Controls, International Capital
Flows and Savins-Investment Correlations in the UK: An Empirical Investigation, 134
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV [REV. WORLD ECON.] 69, 69 (1998) (Ger.) ("Since the late
1970s, it has become common among economists to describe the world financial system as
characterized by perfect capital mobility."); Oussama Kanaan, Tanzania's Experience with Trade
Liberalization, FIN. & DEV., June 2000, at 30, 31, 33; Daisuke Ikemoto, Re-Examining the
Removal of Exchange Control by the Thatcher Government in 1979, at 3-5 (2016) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/Removal%20of/
20exchange%20control%20by/o2Othe%2OThatcher%2OGovernment_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HB
E4-QVUV].
9. See, e.g., Peter N. Stearns, GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 82-84 (2d ed. 2017).
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A. Currency, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology
1. Currency and Capital Controls
From the mid-1980s onward, there has been "a surge in capital flows"
between developed countries and between developed and developing
countries."o Central to such flows has been liberalization of currency and
exchange controls" across jurisdictions. For example, in 1979 the United
Kingdom abolished exchange controls. 12 Prior to this decision, the U.K.
Exchange Control Act of 1947 closely regulated the direct and portfolio
investment capital transactions of British residents.13 The removal of exchange
controls in countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan contributed to
financial globalization and to multinationals' ability to pursue cross-border
activities. 1 Other countries, from France to Tanzania, liberalized their exchange
controls during the 1980s as well. In France, currency regulations were gradually
"dismantled" in the latter part of the 1980s, and within a period of six years were
gone. 15 During the 1980s, Tanzania relaxed some foreign exchange limitations
as part of a broader effort to reduce trade restrictions.' 6
In some countries, liberalization of capital controls became more plausible
once fixed exchange rates were "abandoned" with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system in 1973.17 It has been argued that the combination of floating
exchange rates and information technology and communications developments
foreshadowed the elimination of capital controls.18 Regardless, the resulting
10. Eswar Prasad et al., Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some
Empirical Evidence, in INT'L MONETARY FUND, INDIA'S AND CHINA'S RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH
REFORM AND GROWTH 201, 201 (Wanda Tseng & David Cowen eds., 2005).
11. "Exchange controls are put in place by governments and central banks in order to ban or
restrict the amount of foreign currency or local currency that can be traded or purchased." Exchange
Control, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/exchangecontrol.asp
[https://perma.cc/3EDF-DX2X].
12. Ikemoto, supra note 8, at 1. See generally Richard Davies et al., Evolution of the UK
Banking System, 50 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 321, 327-28 (2010), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb 100407.pdf [https://penna.cc/3DZ3-FHKV].
13. Ikemoto, supra note 8, at 1.
14. Id. at 2; see also ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE:
FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990s, at 7-8 (1994); Rei Masunaga, The Deregulation Process
of Foreign Exchange Control in Capital Transactions in Post-War Japan 3, 6 (Jan. 1997)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.jcif.or.jp/pdf/9701E.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SKF-KVZE]
(discussing Japan's liberalization steps undertaken in the 1980s).
15. Francoise Drumetz, France's Experience of Exchange Controls and Liberalisation, in
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, CHINA'S CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 99, 99 (BIS Papers No. 15, 2003).
16. Kanaan, supra note 8, at 31.
17. The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972-81), INT'L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm [https://perma.cc/2YMF-2RG7].
18. See Ashford et al., supra note 8, at 185; see also infra Section I.A.3.
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world, with floating exchange rates and freely moving capital, has contributed
to globalization and the expansion of multinationals across borders.
2. Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Liberalization
Beginning in the late 1980s, both developed and developing economies
began to experience a significant overall growth in their foreign direct
investment. 19 Although the net effects on countries may have varied,20 the
liberalization involved a familiar set of changes including: (1) tariff reductions,
(2) elimination of quotas, and (3) relaxation of restrictions on foreign direct
investment. 21 The precise contours of these changes varied by jurisdiction. For
example, when Kenya undertook (in the late 1980s) more serious trade reforms
with some external donor pressure, it shifted from import licenses to tariffs as a
mechanism for controlling trade and then gradually reduced the tariffs. 22 India
also liberalized import licensing by expanding the list of goods on its Open
General License list, thereby facilitating imports. 23 Additionally, India reduced
the number of imports over which the government had a monopoly. Between the
periods 1980-81 and 1986-87, the percentage of imports in this government
monopoly category decreased from sixty-seven percent to twenty-seven
percent. 24
3. Technology
The technology innovations that began to take hold in the 1980s reflected
the broader rise of the knowledge-based economy and the importance of
information technology for both industrial production and for movement of
19. See Table of Foreign Direct Investment: Annual Inward and Outward Flows and Stock,
1970-2016, UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?Reportld=
96740 [https://perma.cc/2H2L-79N7].
20. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy?, in
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF REFORM 131, 131-32 (2005);
("Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s were the origin of a strong expansion in international trade.");
S.M. SHAFAEDDIN, TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: STRUCTURAL CHANGE OR DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION? 2 (U.N. Conference on Trade &
Dev., Discussion Paper No. 179, Apr. 2005), http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20053_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HYU7-7VTD] (evaluating the impact of "trade liberalization and market-oriented
economic reform that had started in many developing countries in early 1980s [and that] intensified
in the 1990s").
21. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, supra note 20, at 134.
22. Geoffrey Gertz, Kenya's Trade Liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s: Policies, Impacts,
and Implications 3 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/
files/kenya-background.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT7Q-6BFL].
23. Arvind Panagariya, India in the 1980s and 1990s: A Triumph of Reforms 14 (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 04/43, 2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/
wp0443.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY9Y-K263].
24. Id.
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financial information and assets. 25 Technology and globalization have been
characterized as "mutually reinforcing." 26 Central to this dynamic are the
following factors: (1) microprocessors, (2) communications, (3) biotech, (4)
lighter materials, and (5) a shift from physical to intellectual factors of business
production. 2 7 Market leaders in technology and globalization (including
businesses improving efficiency, quality, customer service, and response time)
can force competitors to follow or sacrifice market share. 28 For a business
expanding beyond its initial jurisdiction, developments in information
technology have brought improvements in business logistics and inventory
management. 29 Moreover, technology allows a broader range of participants to
pursue globalization. 30 Relatedly, technology has also spurred development in
complex financial instruments, such as derivatives, 31 and has made financial
transactions more efficient and less costly. 32
B. Business Border Mobility
For purposes of examining the impact on tax enforcement of this post-1970s
rise in business border-mobility, 33 it is important to make two observations.
First, whether this increased mobility was positive or negative for specific
countries and actors is a separate question from that of its effects on tax
enforcement. This Essay makes no claims about the net benefits of liberalization
in currency, capital controls, trade or investment. Regardless of their impact
elsewhere, the changes did create new and increased challenges for tax
enforcement to which governments have responded, as examined below in Part
II.
Second, the liberalizations described above 34 allowed businesses to pursue
both commercial and financial movement across borders, with varying degrees
of substance. Thus, for example, on the commercial side businesses found new
25. Ashford et al., supra note 8, at 184.
26. Raj Aggarwal, Technology and Globalization as Mutual Reinforcers in Business:
Reorienting Strategic Thinking for the New Millennium, 39 MGMT. INT'L REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
83, 83 (1999).
27. Id. at 86.
28. Id. at 90.
29, Id. at 92.
30. Id. at 93 ("Networked systems are making it easier for technology to cross traditional
national and organizational boundaries allowing even small and new firms ... to leap frog and pose
competitive challenges .... .").
31. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 94; see also Edward LiPuma & Benjamin Lee, Financial
Derivatives and the Rise of Circulation, 34 ECON. & Soc'Y 404, 422 (2005) (noting that prior to
1973, financial derivatives were "[v]irtually nonexistent").
32. Aggarwal, supra note 26, at 94; see also LiPuma & Lee, supra note 31, at 424.
33. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 19.
34. See supra Section I.A. (discussing liberalizations in the regulation of currency, foreign
direct investment, and trade law).
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or broadened import and export markets, new manufacturing locations, and new
investment opportunities. These activities typically involved real and
meaningful movements in goods, services, assets, and production. However, the
liberalizations also facilitated "shifts" across borders whose substance tax
authorities have been inclined to challenge. These scenarios typically include
offshore entities: (1) with few functions or employees; (2) inserted in a chain of
transactions without a clear role; or (3) serving as holding companies for
intangibles. Recognition of the distinction between real migration and more
illusory migration helps anticipate the kinds of information needs and
constraints experienced by home-country tax authorities as they seek to bring
into focus the picture of contemporary multinational enterprise ("MNE")
business models.
H. EMERGING TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE REGIMES
Not only has the latter part of the twentieth century brought increased
business border flexibility, it has also ushered in a period of increased tax
transparency and disclosure.35 Part III considers the connection between the two
trends and the implications for tax policy, but in anticipation of that discussion,
this Part outlines the basic contours of the contemporary disclosure trend.
Before the current round of transparency and disclosure mechanisms
introduced in the past fifteen years and discussed below, there were long-
standing global and domestic tools to facilitate tax authorities' access to
information. For example, both the OECD and the U.N. Model Income Tax
Treaties have historically included an Article 26 detailing procedures for
exchange of information between tax authorities.36 In reality, the effective scope
of these Article 26 provisions was often quite limited. Nonetheless, they
represented a clear recognition that in a world of cross-border business activity
a tax authority may need assistance from other jurisdictions. 37 Additionally,
individual countries adopted their own domestic reporting requirements
35. See Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, § 1.2.3; Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note
2, at 499.
36. See, e.g., XAVIER OBERSON, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN TAX
MATTERS: TOWARDS GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY 14-16 (2015) ("Since its first publication in 1963,
Art. 26 of the OECD Model still represents the most relevant legal basis for international exchange
of information.").
37. OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2014 (FULL VERSION),
at C(26)-1 (2015) (giving commentary on Article 26 of the OECD Model); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON.
& Soc. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 435-36 (2011), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/
UN_Model_201 1Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SNJ-YT7F]. Both models have undergone
change over their decades of existence, including a variety of more recent changes aimed at
improving exchange of information (such as the removal of a "bank secrecy" grounds for declining
to provide information). See, e.g., Ring, Article 26, supra note 2, § 1.1.1.
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designed to obtain a more complete picture of a multinational's activities abroad.
Thus, for example, since the 1960s, the United States has required taxpayers to
complete Form 5471 (or its predecessors), 38 an information return for U.S.
taxpayers who are shareholders, directors, or officers in certain foreign
(controlled) corporations. 39 Since 1984, a Form 926 must be filed by a U.S.
transferor upon the transfer or exchange of property to a foreign corporation. 40
However, not all countries had comparable information reporting
provisions, and even those provisions in the United States were not all-
encompassing. Nor did any of these provisions generate publicly available
information, or the prospect of it. Against this backdrop, the introduction of
multiple avenues for tax transparency and disclosure in recent years has attracted
significant attention and generated momentum for a culture of transparency and
disclosure. Although the foundation for this trend is the fundamental fact of
business migration, more episodic events, including a series of leaks regarding
taxpayer and government conduct, have dictated the precise timing and contours
of the reforms. 41 Thus, this Essay will turn directly to a consideration of key
exemplars of the new transparency and disclosure trend.
A. Country-by-Country Reporting
The OECD's BEPS Action Plan introduced in 2013 included an agenda item
to review and reinvigorate transfer pricing documentation as part of Action 13.42
The Final Report for Action 13 included recommendations for three related
disclosure obligations to be imposed on larger multinationals: (1) a master file,
(2) a local file, and (3) a country-by-country ("CbC") report based on a
template. 43 The master file is expected to provide "standardised information
relevant for all MNE group members" on topics including organizational
structure, business descriptions, intangibles held by the group, intercompany
38. Melissa Redmiles & Jason Wenrich, A History of Controlled Foreign Corporations and
the Foreign Tax Credit, 27 SOI BULL. 129, 134 & n.7 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/his
torycfcftc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUR-UPSR].
39. Id. at 134; About Form 5471, Information Return of U.S. Persons with Respect to Certain
Foreign Corporations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/uac/form-
5471-information-retum-of-u-s-persons-with-respect-to-certain-foreign-corporations
[https://perma.cc/YUM4-D6PL].
40. Form 926 - Filing Requirement for US. Transferors of Property to a Foreign
Corporation, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/individuals/interna
tional-taxpayers/form-926-filing-requirement-for-us-transferors-of-property-to-a-foreign-corpora
tion [https://perma.cc/T8QF-P6XE].
41. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 4.
42. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 23 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BXR-J4VN].
43. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING,
ACTION 13 - 2015 FINAL REPORT 15-17 (2015).
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financial activities, and financial and tax positions of the multinational." The
local file provides jurisdiction-specific information, with a focus on information
regarding transactions between the NINE's entity in the local jurisdiction and
other related parties.4 5 Information provided includes financial data on the
transactions, comparability analysis for transfer pricing, and "selection and
application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method."46
But it has been the third component of the Action 13 disclosure package that
has generated the most interest: CbC reporting. Based on a template provided by
the OECD BEPS Action 13 Final Report, covered multinationals are expected
to provide data on the following categories of information: (1) revenue; (2) profit
(loss) before income tax; (3) cash tax; (4) current year tax accruals; (5) stated
capital; (6) accumulated earnings; (7) number of employees; and (8) tangible
assets.4 7 This data should be provided by the MNE on a country-by-country (not
entity-by-entity) basis. 48
The two major concerns voiced by taxpayers regarding the data are the level
of burden in compiling the information (primarily with regard to the CbC report)
and the roster of potential recipients of the data.4 9 As regards burden, the OECD
did reduce the number of CbC reporting categories from a high of seventeen in
January 2014 and has sought to provide additional guidance on the content of
the reporting categories.50
With respect to the question of who will receive the data, the Final Report
specifies that the NINE parent should make the master file and the local file
available to their local affiliates, who will in turn make the files available to local
authorities.51 In contrast, the CbC report should be filed with the tax authorities
in the jurisdiction of the MNE's parent. Then, that parent jurisdiction would
share the CbC report via treaty information exchange mechanisms with the
jurisdictions in which the NINE has local affiliates. However, the stability of this
disclosure arrangement is unclear. First, given the value of CbC information,
some jurisdictions advocated for direct delivery of the report to them by the
44. Id. at 15-16.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 34-35.
48. OECD, supra note 43, at 11.
49. See, e.g., C.N. Macfarlane, TEI Seeks Consistency in Proposed U.S. Country-by-Country
Reporting Regs, WORLDWIDE TAx DAILY, Mar. 21,2016, LEXIS, 2016 WTD 55-42; Burow, supra
note 6, at 674.
50. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 513 n.22 (showing that the reporting
categories were reduced following feedback on the original OECD draft).
51. OECD, supra note 43, at 21; see also Ryan Finley, Lawmaker Urges Limiting Exchange
ofCbC Reports, 81 TAX NOTES INT'L 751, 751 (2016) (noting Vice President of Tax and Domestic
Economic Policy at the National Association of Manufacturers expressed concern over the direct
filing of the master report with local tax authorities because the information would not be protected
by the U.S. Treasury Department's safeguards in place for the exchange of the CbC reports).
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multinationals, similar to the delivery plan for the master report and the local
report. 52 Direct delivery bypasses the need for a treaty with the MNE parent
jurisdiction and the treaty process itself. Second, and explicitly contrary to BEPS
guidance on the subject, a number of actors in the international community have
advocated for public disclosure of some or all of the CbC report data-and some
jurisdictions have considered this option.53
B. Automatic Exchange of Tax Rulings
Following the LuxLeaks scandal in 2014, in which information on
approximately 500 Luxembourg tax rulings regarding 300 multinationals was
published by the International Consortium of International Journalists
("ICIJ"),5 4 the EU reacted with the introduction of an enhanced disclosure
mechanism. At the heart of the scandal was the assertion that Luxembourg was
intentionally using its tax ruling process to help multinationals reduce income
tax in other jurisdictions (where assets and operations were located) by running
transactions through Luxembourg.55 These rulings were characterized as
inappropriately facilitating the MNEs' worldwide tax avoidance and
minimization strategies. 56 In response, the EU Member States unanimously
agreed in October 2015 to automatically exchange information on cross-border
tax rulings every six months.57 The scandal also triggered further investigation
by the European Parliament and creation of two special committees to
investigate tax rulings practices (TAXE 1 and TAXE 2).58 In their respective
reports, the committees identified transparency along with other measures (such
as substantive law reform) as important tax base protection steps. 59
52. See, e.g., Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 520.
53. See, e.g., William Hoke, The Year in Review: Demands for Greater Tax Transparency
Escalate in 2016, 85 TAx NOTES INT'L 27, 27-29 (2017) (considering recent developments in
corporate and individual tax transparency).
54. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 22. The leaked data was initially taken from
PriceWaterhouseCoopers by its employee, Antoine Deltour. Additional documents were taken by
a second PwC employee, Raphael Haley, and also delivered to the press. Id. at 22 & n.85.
55. Omri Marian, The State Administration ofInternational Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. Bus. L.
REV. 1, 1-2; see also Oei & Ring, supra note 5, at 21.
56. Marian, supra note 55, at 3, 46.
57. European Commission Press Release IP/15/5780, Tax Transparency: Commission
Welcomes Agreement Reached by Member States on the Automatic Exchange of Information on
Tax Rulings (Oct. 6, 2015). Additionally, there have been bilateral agreements between certain
states, such as that between Germany and the Netherlands. Teri Sprackland, Germany, Netherlands
Agree to Share Tax Rulings, 79 TAX NOTES INT'L 203, 203-04 (2015).
58. See, e.g., Stuart Gibson, Ending Abusive Tax Schemes-TAXE II Committee to the Rescue,
82 TAx NoTEs INT'L 721, 721 (2016).
59. Id.
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C. Beneficial Ownership
Another recent transparency and disclosure innovation emerged from the
wake of a tax leak (here, the "Panama Papers" leak). In May of 2016, the ICIJ
released a database containing 11.5 million records (covering forty years of data)
from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca.60 Through the data, more than
214,000 offshore entities were linked to individuals in over 200 countries and
territories. 61 Many of these links were otherwise unknown, and in some cases
represented investment and ownership stakes that had not been declared by the
owners as required by applicable domestic law. 62 In some cases, the political
reverberations from the leak were notable. Leaked documents revealed links
between offshore entities and major political leaders including Chinese
President Xi Jinping,63 U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, 64 Argentine
President Mauricio Macri, 65 and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davio
Gunnlaugsson. 66 Ultimately, the Icelandic Prime Minister resigned due to the
scandal created by the leak's disclosure of his undeclared offshore entity holding
$4,000,000 in bonds.67
In reaction to the Panama Papers leak, a number of countries (including
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland)
have explored or have committed to registration requirements for beneficial
ownership of offshore trusts and other entities. 68 In April 2016, the G-5
60. OFFSHORE LEAKS DATABASE, HTTPS://OFFSHORELEAKS.ICIJ.ORG/ [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/4
WED-7AWX]; Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes Global Array of Crime and
Corruption, INT'L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Apr. 3, 2016), https://panamapa
pers.icij.org/20160403-panama-papers-global-overview.html [https://perma.cc/93DY-JZ2T]; see
also Josh Meyer, Panama Papers: Database Released, Dozens of Americans Listed, NBC NEWS
(May 10, 2016, 6:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/panama-papers/panama-papers-
database-released-dozens-americans-listed-n570771 [https://perma.cc/7U25-TB5B].
61. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 26; see also INT'L CONSORTIUM, supra note 60.
62. See Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 4 ("[The leaks] revealed the secret offshore financial
holdings of high-net-worth individuals and the tax evasion and minimization practices of various
taxpayers, financial institutions, and tax havens.").
63. William Hoke & Stephanie Soong Johnston, Panama Papers Expose Thousands of
Offshore Accounts, 82 TAx NOTES INT'L 103, 103 (2016); see also INT'L CONSORTIUM, supra note
60.
64. Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also INT'L CONSORTIUM, supra note 60.
67. Steven Erlanger, Stephen Castle & Rick Gladstone, Iceland's Prime Minister Steps Down
Amid Panama Papers Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/
world/europe/panama-papers-iceland.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5268-QML8]; Oei & Ring,
supra note 4, at 26.
68. Alexander Lewis, Independent Inquiry Urges Foreign Trust Disclosure Rules Update, 83
TAX NOTES INT'L 34, 34-35 (2016); Alexander Lewis, U.K Setting Up Panama Papers Task
Force, 82 TAx NOTES INT'L 249, 249 (2016); Stephanie Soong Johnston, More Countries Commit
to Public Beneficial Ownership Registries, 82 TAX NOTES INT'L 649, 649 (2016); Teri Sprackland,
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announced to the G-20 69 their commitment to establishing a global system for
automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information.70 The European
Commission already has taken action, adopting a plan for public disclosure of
beneficial ownership registries. 7 '
D. Extractive Industries and Beyond
Global transparency and disclosure steps with links to taxation have also
been taken in arenas formally outside of tax. For example, U.S. securities law
requires businesses engaged in extractive industries (e.g., exploration,
extraction, processing and export of oil, natural gas or minerals) to report certain
payments made to foreign governments. 72 Covered payments include "taxes,
royalties, fees (including license fees), production entitlements, bonuses, and
other material benefits."73 Although the SEC adopted final rules effective
September 201674 implementing the statutory mandate, the Senate's February 3,
2017 resolution under the Congressional Review Act disapproved the final rules
and rendered them effectively nonexistent. 75 The statutory mandate remains in
place, though, leading to uncertainty as to its planned enforcement.
At a global level, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ("EITI")
advances a two-sided approach for reporting in the extractive industries sector. 76
Businesses would report their payments to each jurisdiction, and the
governments would then report the payments that they received, effectively
providing both clarity and a check on inaccurate reporting by either side. 77
German Transparency Registry Proposal Derided as 'Joke,'82 TAX NOTES INT'L 154, 154 (2016);
Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 28.
69. HM Treasury & The Rt Hon George Osborne, G5 Letter to G20 Counterparts Regarding
Action on Beneficial Ownership, Gov'T U.K. (Apr. 14, 2016), https.//www.gov.uk/government/
publications/g5-letter-to-g20-counterparts-regarding-action-on-beneficial-ownership [https://per
ma.cc/G6AS-BRF9].
70. Ryan Finley, EU Countries Announce Beneficial Ownership Exchange Plan, 82 TAX
NOTES INT'L 238, 238 (2016).
71. Alexander Lewis, EU Adopts Public Registries ofBeneficial Ownership Information, 83
TAX NOTES INT'L 100, 100 (2016).
72. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 525, 552.
73. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii) (2012).
74. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (July 27,
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b).
75. Eric Lipton, G.O.P. Hurries to Slash Oil and Gas Rules, Ending Industries' 8-Year Wait,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/politics/republicans-oil-gas-
regulations.html [https://perma.cc/VY7S-S2KT].
76. EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI FACTSHEET 1-2(2014), http://eiti.
org/sites/default/files/documents/2014-07-03_FactsheetEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L8U-48
G4].
77. Id.; see Table of EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/countries [https://perma.cc/23RR-AXP2] (EITI countries and country reports
available).
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Reaching beyond extractive industries, the EU has sought to introduce basic
country-by-country reporting within the financial services sector.7 ' A 2013
Directive calls for covered financial institutions to report the following
information on a country-by-country basis: profit (loss) before tax, tax paid,
subsidies received, and average number of employees. 79 Implementation is
required at the member-state level through enactment of domestic rules requiring
this financial institution reporting. 80
E. Public Disclosure
Finally, it is worth noting a trend within a trend: advocacy for public
disclosure and not simply disclosure to the government in the context of various
transparency and disclosure mechanisms. 8' The move reflects a desire to guard
against several risks including corruption, enforcement bias, collusion, and
limited government resources. Thus, for example, the EITI Standard "requires
EITI Reports that are 'comprehensible, actively promoted, publicly accessible,
and contribute to public debate' (EITI Requirement 7.1)."82 Relatedly, the EITI
reports on links between a country's participation in the EITI project and
declining corruption. 83
With respect to beneficial ownership, a public registry is already part of the
EU platform, and some countries have undertaken the necessary legal reform.8 4
In the context of BEPS Action 13 CbC reporting, the possibility of public
disclosure of some or all of a multinational's report has been the subject of much
78. Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 2, at 552.
79. Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the
Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions
and Investment Firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and
2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 384-85.
80. See, e.g., The Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013,
SI 2013/3118, art. 1, 2 (Eng.) (reporting rules in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland came into effect in January 2014, with the first reporting required by 1 July 2014.); see also
HM Treasury, Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2013:
Guidance, GOv'T U.K. (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-re
quirements-country-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance/capital-requirements-coun
try-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance [https://penna.cc/GNR8-AUM5].
81. See, e.g., Oei & Ring, supra note 4, at 23.
82. Open EITI Data, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, https://eiti.org/ex
plore-data-portal [https://perma.cc/CZ7H-RYD6].
83. Elissaios Papyrakis, Matthias Rieger & Emma Gilberthorpe, Corruption and the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 53 J. DEV. STUD. 295, 295-309 (2017) (citing
specific research linking participation in the EITI project by mineral-rich jurisdictions to a positive
effect on corruption).
84. See, e.g., COMPANIES HOUSE AND DEP'T FOR BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY,
GOV'T U.K., SUMMARY GUIDE FOR COMPANIES - REGISTER OF PEOPLE WITH SIGNIFICANT
CONTROL 1 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/
file/555657/PSC register summary-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/72N3-4ZMN].
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debate. Although the OECD has explicitly stated that the reports should be kept
confidential,85 public awareness of multinational tax planning and the potential
for base erosion has prompted calls for public disclosure of the CbC reports.86
Some jurisdictions have already taken steps toward public disclosure;87
however, the ultimate outcome remains uncertain. The more salient point for
purposes of this Essay is the degree to which the trend for transparency and
disclosure has included a related, though not wholly embraced nor executed,
push for public transparency and disclosure.
III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INCREASED BORDER FLEXIBILITY OF
BUSINESS AND THE NEW FOCUS ON TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE
While neither global business activity nor disclosure requirements in
international tax are new, both have experienced a surge in recent years, as
detailed above.88 Part III argues that this confluence is not a coincidence and
that we might best understand the new transparency and disclosure trend as the
natural consequence-or price-of business migration. Against the baseline
pressure for information created by business migration, the episodic forces of
85. OECD, supra note 43, at 20-21.
86. See, e.g., CIVIL SOC'Y 20 [C20], C20 POSITION PAPER: GOVERNANCE (2014), https://star.
worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/c20-govemance-position-paper-australiajune_2014.pdf
[https://perna.cc/NFG7-7L5N] (urging a commitment to make country-by-country reporting
public thereby "ensuring that poorer countries can easily access this information to address BEPS
in their contexts"); Christian Aid, Christian Aid Submission, in 1 OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON
TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014), https://www.oecd.org/
ctp/transfer-pricing/volumel .pdf [https://perma.cc/MKM3-LJQS] (articulating its "belief that the
Country by Country (CbC) report be made public" in order to hold both governments and taxpayers
more accountable through such tax information); Trade Union Advisory Comm. to the OECD,
OECD Public Consultation on Draft Revised Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting: Comments by the TUAC, in 4 OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON
TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND CBC REPORTING (2014), http://www.oecd.org/cup/
transferpricing/volume4.pdf [https://perma.cc/D23H-JJ8Y] (supporting public disclosure on the
grounds that it would be helpful for developing countries to access the information and "would also
help inform other stakeholders, who are affected by the activities and operations of MNEs,
including workers, local communities, civil society groups and of course citizens at large").
87. See Andrew Goodall, UK. Ministers Reject MPs' Call to Action on Transparency,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 19, 2017, LEXIS, 2017 WTD 13-3. In 2016, the U.K. government
was granted statutory authority to require multinationals to publish CbC reports with data on profits
and taxes. Id. However, there has been subsequent debate regarding whether and how the
government should exercise this new-found power. Id.; EU Council Reviews Status ofIncome Tax
Information Disclosure Proposal, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 19, 2016, LEXIS, 2016 WTD
244-21. The EU has been considering an income tax disclosure proposal. EU Council, supra note
87. At the end of 2016, the French Constitutional Council determined that public CbC reporting
would not be constitutional in France. Alexander Lewis, French Constitutional Council Finds
Public CbC Reporting Unconstitutional, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Dec. 9, 2016, LEXIS, 2016
WTD 238-7.
88. See supra Part I.
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tax leaks have forged the unique design and timing of specific transparency and
disclosure regimes.
A. The Link
One way to appreciate the connection between increased border flexibility
and transparency and disclosure is to consider what a tax authority loses when
business activity moves offshore: (1) close proximity to information, and (2) the
ability to control key sources of abuse. The first point may be more obvious-
to the extent a taxpayer and all of its activities are based in one jurisdiction, the
domestic tax authorities have greater ability to secure needed information,
whether from the taxpayer, from third parties, or from direct observation.
Information, of course, can be difficult to secure even in a wholly domestic
context and may require formal reporting requirements and legal interventions
(such as warrants). However, to the extent the entire process occurs within the
confines of a single jurisdiction, the tax authority is physically closer to
information, has only domestic law constraints on information gathering, and is
unimpeded by language barriers. All of these factors pose a greater challenge to
tax enforcement when business taxpayers begin to cross borders.
The second point, regarding the ability to control key sources of abuse, may
be less obvious at first but is powerful. One significant way in which taxpayers
may aggressively (but legally) engage in tax planning-or alternatively cross the
line into tax abuse-is through reliance on gaps and conflicts in existing law.
Historically, there are numerous examples in U.S. tax law of "opportunities" that
emerged in the domestic law to create advantages for taxpayers that were not
intended by Congress. 89 As noted, in some cases the advantages may have been
entirely legal, but once apparent to Congress and tax authorities, were removed
from the law (e.g., the interaction between the investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation in 1981 that was reversed in 1982).90 Other
"advantages" may be considered entirely inappropriate by the tax authorities,
but once identified, can be tackled through a combination of audit, legal
clarification, or additional reporting requirements (e.g., listed transactions
89. For example, in the corporate tax context, the interplay between the dividends received
deduction under I.R.C. § 243 and deduction losses by corporate shareholders on the sale of stock
created an arbitrage opportunity. This was ultimately addressed through changes in the law
including the addition of I.R.C. §§ 246, 1059. See, e.g., TAX SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
REPORT ON REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 246(C) RESTRICTING THE DIVIDENDS
RECEIVED DEDUCTION 1-6 (Report #750, 1993), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax
Section.Reports/TaxReports_1993/Tax Section_.Report_750.html [https://perma.cc/KGB2-BN
MZ].
90. See, e.g., Stephen A. Meyer, Tax Policy Effects on Investment: The 1981 and 1982 Tax
Acts, BUS. REv., Nov./Dec. 1984, at 3, 6.
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rules).91 However, all of these options are more realistic precisely because the
domestic tax authority can eventually see all of the moving parts-the various
rules on which the taxpayer is building its reporting position-because they are
contained within one system.
Once some of the transactions, assets, and business activities migrate
offshore, a key source of planning includes arbitrage between and among the
domestic tax system and that of one or more other jurisdictions. In such cases,
the domestic tax authorities may not be aware of the foreign tax rules at play (or
may not know how they are being applied in specific taxpayer cases) and may
not be able to identify the resulting tax arbitrage. The opportunity for domestic
tax authorities to respond to abuse becomes less likely and more attenuated when
the arbitrage is conducted with foreign law. Although this argument could be
framed as an informational one (i.e., point one above), it may be more useful to
identify it as a separate concern. The problem does not concern difficulty
securing access to information about the taxpayer's activities, assets, and income
simply because they are less proximate. Rather, the problem is that a key to tax
planning and abuse is arbitrage and inconsistency outside the domestic regime.
Better information about this foreign law problem allows a jurisdiction to
consider options including domestic law reform, application of economic
substance or similar regimes to the taxpayer's transaction, or negotiation with
another country. Moreover, interest in the potential abuse in cross-border tax
planning extends beyond domestic tax authorities to domestic civil society.
Some members of the public, as well as nongovernmental organizations and
news agencies, have the capacity to evaluate these issues but, similarly, may
struggle to the extent taxpayer planning involves otherwise less obvious
interactions between domestic and foreign tax law.
With these two observations about the genesis of problems facing domestic
tax authorities in international transactions, we can appreciate how the new
trends in transparency and disclosure respond to these underlying and inherent
limitations. For example, CbC reporting would automatically require
multinationals to provide a quick and more complete (and potentially uniform)
overview of their global operations, including data about assets, activities, and
transactions outside the ready reach of domestic tax authorities. Exchange of tax
rulings offers a quick window into the arbitrage potential and the intersection of
domestic law with "guaranteed" foreign tax treatment. Using such information,
tax authorities can more completely assess taxpayers' reporting positions and
even identify potential domestic substantive law reforms that may be warranted
in light of potential arbitrage.
91. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 35
(Joint Comm. Print 1982).
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B. The Implications
As outlined above in Section I.B, corporations have pursued a variety of
migration options. They have used the increased border flexibility created by
changes in law (currency, capital controls, foreign direct investment ("FDI"),
and trade) along with advances in information technology and communications
to engage in a genuine re-design and/or expansion of their underlying
commercial enterprise. 92 Additionally, however, some businesses have used the
same changes to pursue paper migrations across borders that are less substantive.
In both cases, when information, assets, and activity are offshore, they pose the
information constraints outlined above.
Seen through this lens, tax authorities' need for new and different
information is not an outgrowth (desirable or not) of efforts such as the OECD
BEPS project. Instead, the fundamental catalyst of the transparency and
disclosure trend is business migration. This primary force is then complemented
by the secondary effects of convulsive events such as tax leaks that dictate the
distinct terms and timing of the reforms.
Awareness of the elemental motivations for and pressures compelling the
new transparency and disclosure regimes may also help frame and explain the
continual contemplation of public disclosure of multinational tax data. Calls for
such disclosure appear across of range of data categories (e.g., CbC reports,
beneficial ownership registries, disclosure of tax, and related subsidies).
Although the details of what is sought and how public it should be do differ, the
root problem is business migration across borders. This is the new normal in
business, and it may ultimately create a new normal-at least for some players-
in corresponding tax compliance commitments through transparency and
disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Just as the migration of individuals presents a host of new issues for tax
systems, the migration of businesses from the 1980s onward introduced new
enforcement and information challenges for tax authorities. With the reduction
in currency, capital, trade, and FDI restrictions that gained traction in the 1980s,
and the simultaneous rise of information technology and communication
capacity, multinationals found a new ability to move across borders. Although
such movement was certainly not new, the scope and volume of such migration
represented a sea of change.
Tax administrations witnessed the impact of this change on their ability to
gain a clear picture of MNEs' global operations. Ultimately, countries
introduced multiple mechanisms, including both direct disclosure and third-
party reporting, to fill the gaps in their knowledge of taxpayer income, activities,
92. See supra Section 1.B.
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transactions, and opportunities for arbitrage. This resulting transparency and
disclosure revolution, with its roots firmly in the reality of corporate migration,
is unlikely to fade even though its precise formulations remain subject to the
continuing forces of tax leaks, international relations, and domestic politics.
